Transcribed

World energy-related CO2 emissions abatement in a “delayed” 450 Scenario relative to the New Policies Scenario

Figure 3.15 World energy-related CO, emissions abatement in a "delayed" 450 Scenario relative to the New Policies Scenario 39 co. Abatement New Policies Scenario 2025 2035 Demand 5% 5% 35 End-use efficie ncy 27% 31% Power plant efficiency 11% 3% 31 Fuel and technology switch 2% 2% 27 Renewables 25% 26% Biofuels 5% 5% Nucle ar 9% 9% 23 Ccs 15% 20% "Delayed" 450 Scenario Total (Gt CO,) 6.2 16.4 19 r 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 19

World energy-related CO2 emissions abatement in a “delayed” 450 Scenario relative to the New Policies Scenario

shared by W.E.R.I on Jul 14

528 views

0 faves

0 shares

0 comments

--- Implications of delayed action ---- Our 450 Scenario, which is consistent with a 50% chance of limiting global temperature increase to 2 °C, assumes a growing intensity of co-ordinated action aga... inst climate change from 2014 onwards. Our 4-for-2 °C Scenario (see Chapter 2) takes a slightly different approach, focusing on national short-term actions which can keep the door to 2 °C open without adversely affecting economic growth in any given country, prior to new coordinated international action from 2020. Both scenarios depend upon early additional action to tackle climate change, in one form or another. But what if this early action is not forthcoming; The analyse here some of the implications if governments and the energy sector were to delay taking stronger action on climate change, continuing on the path of our New Policies Scenario14 until 2019 and then having to take sharp corrective action to get back onto a trajectory compatible with a long-term global temperature increase of no more than 2 °C. It is an illustrative case, essentially a “delayed” 450 Scenario, based on the hypothesis that, for a variety of possible reasons, a number of years could pass before a significant new boost is given to national policies and low-carbon investment. Delaying action on climate change inevitably makes the 2 °C ever more challenging to achieve. In a scenario where there is such a delay, energy-related CO2 emissions would reach 34.4 Gt in 2019 (as in our New Policies Scenario) but then need, to meet the 2 °C target, to decline even more rapidly after this date, ending at 20.6 Gt in 2035 (Figure 3.15). In essence, the additional emissions in the period to 2020 result in an emissions reduction trajectory thereafter which is even more challenging than our 450 Scenario. The emissions reduction after 2020 is driven by improvements in energy efficiency (particularly in the industry and services sectors), even more rapid deployment of renewable energy technologies in the power sector and widespread adoption of CCS. Energy efficiency is rapidly increased in industry by phasing out old and inefficient facilities in energy-intensive industries, as well as by introducing new efficient motor systems. Energy efficiency in buildings is stepped up by replacing oil- and gas-fired boilers for space and water heating by more efficient ones. In the power sector, additional efficient coal and gas power plants are introduced, with less-efficient plants being operated less or completely retired. The increase in electricity generation from renewables comes mainly from wind power, but also from hydro, bioenergy and solar PV. The key regions affected are China, the United States and India. As well, CCS is very rapidly deployed, with the power sector accounting for nearly 70% of all CCS-related emissions savings, industry for more than 25% and the transformation sector for 5%. Delaying climate action takes the world beyond the date, estimated to be 2017 in, at which then existing energy infrastructure locks-in the entire remaining carbon emissions budget to 2035. The result is that much more costly actions are required subsequently to undo the lock-in effect, including the early retirement of assets, lower utilisation or idling of carbon-intensive capacity and increased investment in CCS retrofiting. In short, delayed action creates more stranded assets in the energy sector. In the power sector, the delay results in the construction of a greater number of new fossil-fuelled plants up to 2020, around 185 Gw of capacity. As a result, 164 Gw of power capacity must be either retired or idled (101 GW collectively), or retrofited with CCS (63 GW), between 2020 and 2035. Developing countries are most exposed to these lock-in effects, as they build two-thirds of the additional fossil-fuel plants constructed up to 2020, many of which are inefficient coal plants. To compensate for emissions from this capacity, an extra 130 GW of plants in developing countries must be retired, idled or retrofited with CCS after 2020. It follows that, if governments are to stand by their commitment to limit the average rise in the global temperature to no more than 2 °C, developing countries have the most to gain from moving towards clean energy investment more quickly and_ the most to lose from carbon lock-in. A swift move away from subcritical coal-fired power plants, as highlighted in the 4-for-2 °C Scenario in Chapter 2, is a step in this regard and will help to meet subsequent goals at a lower cost.